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Physical Determinability
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aBstract
I defend a dualist model of psychophysical causal relevance, according to 
which mental events are not causes in the physical domain, but are causally 
relevant in this domain because they enable — or, in other words, provide 
the appropriate structure for — physical events to be caused. More specifi-
cally, I defend the claim that mental events are ‘double preventers’ within 
the physical domain, where double preventers are a type of enabling event. 
The distinction that I make between causes and enabling events and the 
dualist model of psychophysical causal relevance that I defend has emerged 
from my acceptance of the powers theory of causation. In this paper, I ex-
plore how this dualist model of psychophysical causal relevance offers a re-
sponse to Papineau’s defence of the causal completeness principle via the 
conservation laws.
Keywords: the causal completeness principle, conservation laws, the powers 
theory of causation, double prevention
1. Introduction
In the contemporary mental causation debate, it is generally accepted that some 
version of physicalism — the doctrine that everything is physically constituted — 
must be true in virtue of the causal completeness of the physical domain. Despite 
the importance of the causal completeness principle to physicalism, detailed de-
fences of this principle are seldom provided. In ‘The Rise of Physicalism’, Papi-
neau attempts to address this gap in the literature, providing what is, without 
doubt, one of the most thorough defences of the principle to date (Papineau, 
2001). In this defence, Papineau rejects the claim that there is sui generis mental 
energy, arguing that if there is no sui generis mental energy then this, in combi-
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nation with the laws of conservation of energy and momentum, establishes the 
causal completeness principle. In an earlier paper I argued that Papineau’s argu-
ment is questionable because it smuggles in two causal assumptions, either one 
of which the interactive dualist is free to reject (Gibb, 2010). The first assump-
tion is that the redistribution of energy and momentum cannot be brought about 
without supplying energy or momentum (Redistribution). The second is that the 
only way that something non-physical could contribute to determining an effect 
in a physical system is by 1) affecting the amount of energy or momentum in it, or 
2) redistributing the energy or momentum in it (Physical Determinability). Since 
writing that paper, I have gone on to develop and defend a new dualist model of 
psychophysical causal relevance that is based within the framework of a powers 
theory of causation. According to this model, the causal role of mental events in 
the physical domain is to serve as ‘double preventers’. (See, for example, Gibb, 
2013.) The aim of this paper is to locate this dualist model of psychophysical 
causal relevance within my previous discussion of Papineau’s argument. I argue 
that this dualist model entails the rejection of one of the hidden causal premises 
in Papineau’s argument that I identified in Gibb, 2010 — namely, Physical Deter-
minability. By rejecting Physical Determinability, it thereby allows one to reject 
Papineau’s argument for the causal completeness principle.
2. The Argument from Causal Overdetermination
Alongside most contemporary physicalists, Papineau holds that, given the 
causal completeness principle — which he formulates as the claim that ‘All phys-
ical effects are fully determined by law by prior physical events’ — a relatively 
straightforward argument can be presented for physicalism and against dual-
ism (Papineau, 2001, p. 8). This three-premise argument, commonly referred 
to as the ‘argument from causal overdetermination’, can be set out as follows:
 1. Relevance: Mental events are causally relevant in the physical domain.
 2. Completeness: All physical effects are fully determined by law by prior 
physical events.
 3. Exclusion: There is no systematic causal overdetermination.
Mental events (that are causally relevant in the physical domain) are identi-
cal with physical events.1
1 For simplicity, with Papineau, I shall assume that the causal relata are property instantiations (Papineau, 
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To briefly explain this argument: In accordance with Relevance, say that M is a 
mental event and that it causes physical event E. Given Completeness, E must be 
fully determined by prior physical events. Call the (complex) physical event that 
fully determines E ‘P’. Given Exclusion, as P fully determines E, then, for M to 
determine E as well, contrary to dualism, M must be identical with P or part of 
a cause that is identical with P.
Assuming that the argument from causal overdetermination is valid, the 
dualist must reject either Relevance, Completeness or Exclusion. Along with 
most of those in the mental causation debate, few dualists are willing to reject 
Relevance — that we are capable of performing intentional actions which result 
in the movement of our bodies is taken for granted in everyday life; to aban-
don this idea is to abandon our pretheoretical conception of human agency. 
Rejecting Exclusion is also an unattractive option for the dualist. Depend-
ing on one’s account of the causal relation, one may well allow that there are 
isolated cases of causal overdetermination. Hence, for example, if two shots 
are independently fired and both bullets reach the victim at the same time, 
given that each bullet striking was on its own enough to determine the death 
of the victim, then the victim’s death was causally overdetermined. But what 
seems implausible is that events are systematically — that is, as a general rule 
— causally overdetermined. And, it is precisely this kind of systematic causal 
overdetermination that the combination of Relevance and Completeness gives 
rise to, unless physicalism is correct. Consequently, given that the argument 
from causal overdetermination is valid, the plausibility of dualism hinges upon 
whether or not Completeness is false.
3. Papineau’s Argument for Completeness
The conclusion of Papineau’s ‘The Rise of Physicalism’ is that Completeness «by 
any normal inductive standards, has been fully established by over a century of 
empirical research» (Papineau, 2001, p. 33). What is Papineau’s argument for 
Completeness?
A popular assumption in the mental causation debate is that Completeness 
is a fact of current science, that there is some evidential connection between 
2001, p. 10). Hence, following Kim, I shall assume that events are the causal relata, where an event is 
the instantiation of a property by a substance at a time. Given this Kimean account of the causal relata, 
the identity of mental causes with physical causes requires the identity of mental properties with physical 
properties. Therefore, the conclusion of the argument from causal overdetermination directly rules out 
both substance dualism and property dualism.
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current science and ‘finished’ science and, hence, that finished science will 
also support Completeness. But this raises the question of how exactly current 
science is supposed to provide support for Completeness, and it is this question 
that Papineau’s paper is devoted to answering.
Papineau explains that his original thought was that Completeness would 
follow from the laws of conservation of energy and momentum, which are a cor-
nerstone of current physics. According to these laws:
Conservation: Every physical system is conservative or is part of a larger sys-
tem that is conservative (where a system is conservative if its total amount 
of energy and linear momentum can be redistributed, but not altered in 
amount, by changes that happen within it).2
As Papineau comments, «[i]f the laws of mechanics tell us that important 
physical quantities are conserved regardless of what happens, then doesn’t it 
follow that the later states of physical systems are always fully determined by 
their earlier physical states?» (Papineau, 2001, p. 14).
But matters are not quite so straightforward. According to Papineau, the 
crucial problem with this defence of Completeness is that the conservation laws 
are consistent with the existence of sui generis mental energy, for the conser-
vation laws do not tell us what kinds of energy there are, only that any kind of 
energy that does exist must operate conservatively. If sui generis mental energy 
does exist, then provided that it operates conservatively, Conservation does 
nothing to rule out the possibility that the occurrence of some physical effects 
require the transfer of such mental energy. Conservation is therefore consistent 
with the claim that not every physical effect is fully determined by prior physical 
events. Hence, Conservation does not entail Completeness.
As a consequence of this reasoning, in ‘The Rise of Physicalism’ Papineau’s 
central aim is to provide a rejection of the claim that sui generis mental energy 
does exist. Papineau provides two detailed arguments — the «argument from 
fundamental forces» (Papineau, 2001, pp. 28–30) and the ‘argument from 
physiology’ (Papineau, 2001, pp. 30–32) — to demonstrate that, in light of re-
cent evidence from theoretical physics and physiological research, we can con-
clude that there is probably no sui generis mental energy. The argument from 
fundamental forces claims that, given the arguments behind the conservation 
2 See the Oxford Dictionary of Physics (Daintith, 2005) for a formulation of the conservation laws along 
these lines.
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of energy, we can inductively reason that «all apparently special forces char-
acteristically reduce to a small stock of basic physical forces which conserve 
energy» (Papineau, 2001, p. 28). If all special forces reduce to basic physical 
forces, there are no sui generis mental forces. The Argument from Physiology 
leads to the rejection of the existence of sui generis mental forces because if 
«there were such forces, they could be expected to display some manifestation 
of their presence» (Papineau, 2001, p. 31). However, detailed physiological in-
vestigation reveals no such thing.3 By demonstrating that there probably is no 
sui generis mental energy, Papineau considers that he has demonstrated that 
Completeness is probably true.
4. The Problem with Papineau’s Argument
In this discussion my concern is not with the issue of whether or not Papineau’s 
attempt to establish that there is no non-physical energy is successful. It is in-
stead with the structure of the argument for Completeness that Papineau is offer-
ing. What prompted Papineau’s discussion of whether or not there is sui generis 
mental energy was the idea that if there isn’t any such energy, then the conserva-
tion laws entail Completeness. Having established that there probably is no sui 
generis mental energy, Papineau concludes that Completeness is probably true. 
Hence, the argument that Papineau is offering for Completeness is as follows:
 1. Every physical system is conservative or is part of a larger system that is 
conservative (Conservation).
 2. There is no non-physical energy (Energy).
All physical effects are fully determined by law by prior physical events 
(Completeness).4
3 Although Papineau’s discussion is framed in terms of forces rather than in terms of energy, Papineau’s 
argument can be interpreted as an argument against the existence of sui generis mental energy. This is 
not to misrepresent Papineau’s position. In classical contexts, force-based formulations of mechanics and 
energy-based formulations are arguably interderivable: the terms (and principles) of either theory can ar-
guably be derived from those of the other. Hence, energy (both kinetic and potential) is initially defined 
in terms of the work done by a force acting on a body, so potential and kinetic energy can be derived from 
force, and equally, force can be derived from potential energy. Given that sui generis mental energy can be 
defined in terms of the work done by a sui generis mental force, evidence against mental forces can also be 
taken to be evidence against mental energy. (See Goldstein, Poole, & Safko, 2002, §1.1.)
4 For further defence of the claim that this is the argument for Completeness that Papineau (2001) is wish-
ing to present, see Gibb (2010).
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Setting aside the question of whether Papineau’s defence of Energy is success-
ful, is this argument valid in the first place? Does the combination of Conserva-
tion and Energy entail Completeness?
In Gibb, 2010, I argue that it is not valid. In particular, I argue that to move 
from the combination of Conservation and Energy to Completeness, one must 
make two causal assumptions without which neither Conservation nor Energy 
nor their combination could be used to defend Completeness. Here, I provide a 
summary of my argument.
Conservation is inconsistent with an event determining an effect in a physi-
cal system by altering the amount of energy or momentum in it, unless that 
event is from within a larger conservative system of which the physical system is 
a part. Given Energy, a physical system is not part of a larger conservative sys-
tem that includes non-physical energy. The combination of Conservation and 
Energy therefore entails that non-physical events cannot determine an effect in 
a physical system by altering the amount of energy or momentum in it — that is, 
by adding or taking away energy or momentum. This is because, given Energy, 
the energy-momentum gain (loss) would not be compensated by an energy-
momentum loss (gain), and, hence, would violate Conservation.
Although the combination of Conservation and Energy rules out the possi-
bility of non-physical events determining an effect in a physical system by alter-
ing the amount of energy or momentum in it, this combination does not rule out 
the possibility of non-physical events determining an effect in a physical system 
by redistributing the energy and momentum in it — unless the non-physical can 
only redistribute the energy and momentum in a physical system by supplying 
energy or momentum to it. The mere combination of Conservation and Energy 
is therefore consistent with the claim that the determination of some physical 
effects requires the redistribution of energy or momentum by non-physical 
events. To rule this out, Papineau’s argument for Completeness requires the fol-
lowing causal premise:
Redistribution: Redistribution of energy and momentum cannot be brought 
about without supplying energy or momentum.
But the combination of Conservation, Energy and Redistribution still does not 
entail Completeness. A second causal premise is required which limits the ways 
in which an event could determine an effect in a physical system. The combi-
nation of Conservation, Energy and Redistribution entails that non-physical 
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events cannot contribute to determining an effect in a physical system by alter-
ing the amount of energy or momentum in it or by redistributing the energy or 
momentum in it. But the question that this now raises is whether there is some 
alternative way that a non-physical event might contribute to determining an 
effect in a physical system. Couldn’t it be the case that for some physical effects 
to be fully determined, non-physical events must play a role, where this role 
does not involve them altering the amount of energy or momentum in a physical 
system or redistributing it? If this were the case, then Completeness would be 
false. Papineau’s argument for Completeness therefore requires the following 
additional causal premise:
Physical Determinability: The only way that something non-physical could 
contribute to determining an effect in a physical system is by 1) affecting 
the amount of energy or momentum in it, or 2) redistributing the energy or 
momentum in it.
Bringing these premises together, we have the following argument for Com-
pleteness:
 1. Every physical system is conservative or is part of a larger system that is 
conservative (Conservation).
 2. There is no non-physical energy (Energy).
 3. Redistribution of energy and momentum cannot be brought about with-
out supplying energy or momentum (Redistribution).
 4. The only way that something non-physical could contribute to determin-
ing an effect in a physical system is by 1) affecting the amount of energy or 
momentum in it, or 2) redistributing the energy or momentum in it (Physical 
Determinability).
All physical effects are fully determined by law by prior physical events. 
(Completeness).5
Papineau’s assumption that one can move easily from the combination of Con-
servation and Energy to Completeness and, hence, to physicalism is clearly 
incorrect. There is space for the dualist to provide a model of psychophysical 
5 Note, I only wish to draw attention to two of the additional premises that Papineau’s argument requires. 
Whether there are other premises that are required to make Papineau’s argument valid is a further ques-
tion that I do not need to engage with for the purpose of this paper.
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causal relevance that involves the rejection of either Redistribution or Physical 
Determinability.
Are there any such dualist models of psychophysical causal relevance? 
C.D. Broad’s model of psychophysical causal relevance appears to hinge 
upon the denial of Redistribution, for Broad’s suggestion is that mental 
events prompt transfers of energy between physical events without them-
selves transferring energy (Broad, 1925, p. 109). But far more perplexing 
is the issue of whether any plausible dualist model of psychophysical causal 
relevance that denies Physical Determinability exists. A common assumption 
in the contemporary mental causation debate, and a relic of the mechanis-
tic model of psychophysical causal relevance offered by Descartes, is that for 
mental events to play a role in determining physical effects they must bring 
about changes in the motion of matter.6 If this assumption is correct, then 
Physical Determinability must be true, as all such changes will be explicable 
in terms of energy and momentum redistribution. Hence, the very idea of a 
dualist model of psychophysical causal relevance that denies Physical Deter-
minability will strike many as strange.
In Gibb, 2010, I observed that E. J. Lowe’s model of psychophysical causal 
relevance offers one potential way for the dualist to deny Physical Determin-
ability (Lowe, 1993, 1999, 2000, 2008). Lowe claims that if we were to trace 
the causal chains of neural events that give rise to a bodily movement back-
wards, we would discover that these causal chains display a highly complex, 
fractal, tree-like structure. From a purely physical perspective, the fact that 
these causal chains of neural events converge on a particular event, the bodily 
movement, looks like a remarkable coincidence. The role of mental events in 
the physical domain, according to Lowe, is to render the fact that a causal tree 
of neural events converges on a particular bodily movement non-coincidental. 
That is, a mental event is responsible for the fact that a set of mutually indepen-
dent neural events together give rise to a particular bodily movement. Why, 
according to Lowe, does this amount to a denial of Physical Determinability? 
Well, crucially Lowe holds that mental events do not play this convergence role 
by acting on any individual neural event or set of neural events, and it is for 
this reason that he considers his model of psychophysical causal relevance to 
be a denial of Physical Determinability. Indeed, Lowe holds that a mental event 
6 This certainly appears to be Papineau’s 2001 assumption, for he only considers the possibility that the 
mental might determine the physical by “moving matter”.
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cannot play this convergence role by transferring energy or momentum to any 
neural event or set of neural events in the causal tree, for, according to him, 
there will be no single neural event or set of neural events in the causal tree 
that the mental event can plausibly be said to transfer energy or momentum to 
(Lowe, 1999, p. 66).7
At the time of writing that paper I was tempted to conclude that Lowe’s du-
alist model of psychophysical causal relevance presented the only way for the 
dualist to deny Physical Determinability. However, since then I have developed 
my own dualist model of psychophysical causal relevance — the double preven-
tion model. As I shall argue in this paper, it also leads to the rejection of Physi-
cal Determinability — indeed, the fact that it is a denial of Physical Determin-
ability is perhaps more obvious than the fact that Lowe’s model is. It is to this 
dualist model of psychophysical causal relevance that I now turn.
5. The Double Prevention Model
The dualist model of psychophysical causal relevance that I propose has 
emerged from my acceptance of a powers theory of causation. To explain this 
model, I therefore need to begin by briefly explaining the key elements of this 
theory of causation. According to the powers theory of causation, powers or 
dispositions (I use these terms interchangeably) provide the basis for an ac-
count of the causal relation. Two claims are central to this account of causation:
First, intrinsic properties bestow irreducible powers on their bearers — to 
maintain a powers theory of causation, one must be a realist about powers.8 
Given this stance on powers, the power to break is built into some property of a 
porcelain vase, and it is because it has this property that the vase is disposed to 
break when dropped. Note, dispositions are to be held apart from their mani-
festations. (Although the manifestation of a disposition will itself be a disposi-
tion). For a disposition to be real it need not be manifesting any manifestation. 
Indeed, it need never manifest any manifestation. Thus a porcelain vase that 
never exists in circumstances that would allow it to manifest its fragility, is still 
fragile despite never manifesting its fragility.
7 For a far more detailed discussion of the claim that Lowe’s model of psychophysical causal relevance is a 
denial of Physical Determinability, see Gibb (2010, pp. 371–374).
8 To be a realist about powers one need not maintain that properties are exhausted by their dispositional-
ity (for such an account, see Shoemaker, 1980). It is also consistent with accounts that understand every 
property to be both dispositional and qualitative. (For this account, see Martin, 2008 and Heil, 2003.) In 
this paper, I take a neutral stance on these different forms of realism about powers.
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Secondly, causation just is the manifestation of these powers. This claim 
can be developed in various ways, giving rise to different variations of the pow-
ers theory of causation. I shall adopt C.B. Martin’s account, according to which 
causation is the mutual manifestation of reciprocal disposition partners (Mar-
tin, 2008). Usually, a particular manifestation of a disposition depends on the 
presence of other dispositions. Hence, the breaking of a vase when it is dropped 
depends not only on the vase being fragile, but also on the surface on which it 
lands being hard. Therefore, when a vase is dropped on a surface and breaks 
this is not only a manifestation of its fragility, but also of the surface’s hardness. 
Martin describes the vase’s fragility and the surface’s hardness as «reciprocal 
disposition partners’ and the breaking of the vase as their mutual manifesta-
tion». Hence, causation is, according to Martin, the mutual manifestation of 
reciprocal disposition partners.
One of the things that is interesting about the powers theory of causation 
is its analysis of cases of double prevention. Double prevention occurs when 
an event that would prevent another event from having a certain effect is itself 
prevented from doing so. To give an example of double prevention, imagine 
that a barrier is placed in front of a porcelain vase, but that the barrier is wired 
up to a device which will cause the barrier to explode if a button on the device 
is pressed. Normally, if a rock is thrown at the vase, the barrier would prevent 
the rock from coming into contact with and, hence, breaking the vase. But, if 
the device’s button is pressed, this destroys the barrier, hence allowing the rock 
to hit the vase. This is a case of double prevention. The barrier would have pre-
vented the rock from breaking the vase, but is prevented from doing so by the 
pressing of the button. Consequently, the vase breaks.
Given the powers theory of causation, one can offer the following account 
of double prevention. In most cases, the manifestation of a disposition depends 
not only on certain dispositions being present but also on others being absent. 
For example, the vase’s manifesting its fragility when a rock is thrown at it de-
pends on the absence of the solidity of the barrier. This is because one disposi-
tion may be disposed to prevent the manifestation of another — the solidity of 
the barrier is disposed to prevent the mutual manifestation that is the vase’s fra-
gility and the rock’s momentum and hardness. According to the powers theory 
of causation, in the case of double prevention, a disposition that is disposed to 
prevent the manifestation of another disposition, is itself prevented from doing 
so by the presence of a third disposition. Hence, taking the example of double 
prevention that I have given, the solidity of the barrier is disposed to prevent the 
 Physical Determinability 79
rock from breaking the vase, but is itself prevented from doing so by the press-
ing of the device’s button.
What is interesting is that, given the powers theory of causation, a double 
preventer event cannot be counted as a cause of the event that it has prevented 
from being prevented. An absence is not a cause according to the powers theory 
of causation — an absence cannot bear powers and hence cannot be disposed 
to act in any way. But, unless absences are causes, there cannot be a chain of 
unbroken causation from the double preventer event to the event that it has 
prevented from being prevented. Hence, taking our example of double preven-
tion, the pressing of the button causes the destruction of the barrier. But, given 
the powers theory of causation, the barrier’s destruction (that is, the barrier’s 
absence) cannot, in turn, be a cause of the vase’s breaking. Hence, given the 
powers theory of causation, there cannot be a chain of unbroken causation from 
the pressing of the device’s button (the double preventer event) to the breaking 
of the vase (the event that is prevented from being prevented).9
This fact about the powers theory of causation has led me to introduce a 
distinction between events that are causes and events that are enablers. En-
abling events are not causes, although they enable — or, in other words, permit 
— events to be caused. Given the powers theory of causation, double preventer 
events are enabling events. They do not cause the event that they prevent from 
being prevented. Instead, they enable the event to be caused. They enable the 
event to be caused by preventing an event from preventing it from being caused.
Despite not being a cause of the event that it prevents from being prevented, 
a double preventer event is causally relevant to the event that it prevents from 
being prevented, and not just in a merely explanatory sense. In those causal 
situations involving enabling events, for the effect to be determined, as well as 
the cause, a further event must occur whose role is to enable the causal rela-
tion to occur. Indeed, I hold that in cases of double prevention the role of an 
enabling event is no less important than the role of a cause.10
According to my dualist model of psychophysical causal relevance, which is 
premised upon the acceptance of the powers theory of causation, mental events 
are enabling events. They are causally relevant in the physical domain, not be-
cause they cause physical events, but because they enable physical events to be 
9 For further defence of the claim that, given the powers theory of causation, a double preventer event 
cannot be counted as a cause of the event that it has prevented from being prevented, see, for example, 
Mumford and Anjum (2009).
10 For defence of this claim, see, for example, Gibb (forthcoming b).
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caused. More specifically, my claim is that mental events are double preventers 
in the physical domain. A mental event enables a certain bodily movement to take 
place by enabling a neurological event to cause the bodily movement. It enables 
this causal relation to take place by preventing a mental event from preventing it.
To understand this model of psychophysical causal relevance more clearly, 
let me give a specific example. Assume that dualism is true and, hence, that 
mental events are not identical with physical events. Call the event that is neu-
ron 1 firing in Kate’s brain ‘n1’, the event that is neuron 2 firing in her brain 
‘n2’ and the event that is Kate’s arm’s raising ‘b1’. Let us say that the firing 
of neuron 1 is disposed to make neuron 2 fire, which is disposed to make the 
muscle fibres contract in Kate’s arm and her arm raise. For simplicity, let us 
suppose that no other dispositions are required for any of these manifestations. 
Hence, n1 causes n2 and n2 causes b1.
Now, let us say that n2’s causing b1 would be prevented by Kate’s desire to 
keep her body still. (Call this mental event ‘m2’). But Kate has a conflicting 
desire. Although she has the desire to keep still, she also has the stronger con-
f licting desire to raise her arm — call this mental event ‘m1’ — so she can flick a 
piece of hair from her eye. Having this stronger desire to raise her arm prevents 
the manifestation of her desire to keep her body still. That is, m1 prevents m2 
from preventing n2 from causing b1. Consequently, she raises her arm. This 
can be presented diagrammatically as follows:
In Figure 1, a solid line ending in an arrow depicts a causal relation; a solid 
line ending in a dot depicts an inhibitory connection; a broken line ending in 
an arrow depicts a causal connection that failed to occur; a broken line ending 
in a dot depicts an inhibitory connection that failed to occur and a circle around 
a letter signifies the non-existence of the relevant event.
M1 is not a cause in the physical domain, but rather an enabling event. M1 
enables the physical event b1 to take place by enabling n2 to cause b1. It en-
 m1   m2     b2 
   b1  n1 n2 
Figure 1
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ables n2 to cause b1 by preventing m2 from preventing n2 from causing b1. 
As m1 is an enabling event in the physical domain, it is causally relevant in the 
physical domain. I refer to this dualist model of psychophysical causal relevance 
as ‘the double prevention model’.
Elsewhere, I argue that the double prevention model, like Lowe’s model, has 
a number of important advantages over standard dualist models of psychophysi-
cal causal relevance which take the causal role of mental events in the physical 
domain to be that of causing a neurological event or set of neurological events 
that ultimately give rise to some movement of the limbs. These include the fact 
that a particularly strong version of the causal completeness principle, such as 
the one that Papineau offers in ‘The Rise of Physicalism’, is required to rule out 
the double prevention model.11 This is important because, obviously, the stron-
ger the causal completeness principle is the harder it will be to defend. Equally, 
and relatedly, the ‘no-gap argument’ for the causal completeness principle which 
is often alluded to by proponents of this principle does not create a problem for 
the double prevention model as, given the double prevention model, the causal 
role of mental events in the physical domain is not to fill in gaps in causal chains 
of physical events.12 But can the double prevention model offer a response to Pa-
pineau’s defence of the causal completeness principle via the conservation laws?
6. The Double Prevention Model and Papineau’s Argument
I argued in §4 that to move from the combination of Conservation and Energy 
to Completeness one must also accept two causal claims — Redistribution and 
Physical Determinability. Without these additional claims, neither Conserva-
tion nor Energy nor their combination provide an argument for Completeness. 
As I will now explain, the double prevention model’s response to Papineau’s 
defence of Completeness is to reject Physical Determinability.
First, let us begin by again noting that, given the double prevention model, 
non-physical events do contribute to determining effects in a physical system. 
Enabling events contribute to determining the events that they enable to be 
caused. More specifically, double preventer events — which are one kind of 
enabling event — contribute to determining the events that they prevent from 
being prevented. Hence, return to the example of a case of double prevention, 
11 See Gibb (forthcoming b).
12 See Gibb (forthcoming a).
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in which a barrier would have prevented a rock from breaking a vase, but is pre-
vented from doing so by pressing a device’s button. Quite clearly, the pressing 
of the device’s button — the double preventer event — contributes, along with 
the throwing of the rock, to determining the vase’s breaking. The throwing 
of the rock was not enough to make the vase break. The button also had to be 
pressed. If the button had not been pressed, the vase would not have broken. 
And the same is no less true if, rather than a physical event, a non-physical event 
serves as a double preventer in the physical domain. Hence, taking the example 
of double prevention set out in Figure 1, Kate’s desire to raise her arm (m1) 
contributes, along with the firing of neuron 2 (n2), to determining Kate’s arm’s 
raising (b1). The firing of neuron 2 was not enough to make Kate’s arm rise. 
Kate also had to have the desire to raise her arm. If Kate had not had this desire, 
her arm would not have raised. Hence, given the double prevention model, non-
physical events contribute to determining effects in a physical system.
But, contrary to Physical Determinability, given the double prevention 
model, non-physical events do not contribute to determining physical effects 
by affecting the amount of energy or momentum in a physical system or by re-
distributing it. The reason is relatively straightforward. Again consider Figure 
1. Although m1 contributes to determining b1, quite clearly it does not do so 
by acting on any physical event or any set of physical events. Rather, it does 
so by acting on another non-physical event (m2). Because m1 does not act on 
any physical event or set of physical events, there is no physical event or set of 
physical events that m1 could possibly be accused of transferring energy or mo-
mentum to or redistributing energy or momentum between. Nor is there any 
physical event or set of physical events that m2 could possibly be accused of 
transferring energy or momentum to or redistributing energy or momentum 
between, for the whole point is that m1 prevents m2 from preventing n2 caus-
ing b1 — that is, m1 prevents m2 from acting on any physical event.
Hence, given the double prevention model, m1(a non-physical event) con-
tributes to determining b1 (a physical event) but it does not do so by affecting 
the amount of energy or momentum in a physical system or by redistributing 
it. Given the double prevention model, the dualist can therefore reject Physi-
cal Determinability and, hence, Papineau’s argument for Completeness via the 
conservation laws.
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7. Objections
In this section I shall briefly raise and respond to some potential objections 
to the double prevention model’s response to Papineau’s argument for Com-
pleteness via the conservation laws. As I hope to make clear, the problem with 
most of these objections is their failure to properly embed the dualist model of 
psychophysical causal relevance that I have proposed in the framework of the 
powers theory of causation.
O1: Although m1 does not act on any physical event, it does act on a mental 
event (m2). Say that m1 prevents m2 from preventing n2 causing b1 by 
causing m2 to cease to exist (i.e. upon gaining the desire to raise her arm, 
Kate loses the desire to keep her body still). How can m1 do this? How 
can m1, a non-physical event, cause m2 to cease to exist — or, indeed, 
have any affect on m2 at all — in light of the arguments that Papineau 
presents in ‘The Rise of Physicalism’? The combination of Papineau’s 
argument from fundamental forces and his argument from physiology 
provide a convincing case against the existence of sui generis mental 
energy. But if there is no sui generis mental energy, how could m1 cause 
m2 to cease to exist, for surely this causal process must ultimately in-
volve the redistribution of sui generis mental energy?
R1: This objection is a compelling one if one accepts the energy transfer-
ence theory of causation, according to which causation is the transference of a 
quantity from cause to effect, where this quantity is energy or momentum. The 
difficult issue of how the energy transference theory of causation should anal-
yse cases in which the supposed effect is an absence (in this particular case, the 
absence of m2) is one that we needn’t get involved with here.13 The point is that, 
given the energy transference theory of causation, for m1 to have played any 
causal role in bringing about the non-existence of m2, it must have transferred 
energy to something, and unless we accept some version of physicalism, we are 
forced to accept that the energy which it transfers is non-physical. If the energy 
transference theory of causation is correct but there is no sui generis mental 
energy, a (non-physical) mental event can no more be a cause in the mental do-
13 The difficulty being that absences cannot be, as Fair puts it, the sources or the sinks of energy-momen-
tum. See Fair (1979, p. 246).
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main than it can be a cause in the physical domain.14
But the double prevention model is not premised upon the acceptance of the 
energy transference theory of causation. Nor could it be. The energy transfer-
ence theory of causation entails Physical Determinability for according to the 
energy transference theory of causation all effects are energy or momentum 
gains (and all causes, energy or momentum losses). But the double prevention 
model rejects Physical Determinability and, in doing so, it rejects the energy 
transference theory of causation.
The double prevention model should not be divorced from the theory of 
causation that it is premised on — the powers theory of causation. Given the 
powers theory of causation, mental causation is not the transfer of mental en-
ergy. Rather, mental causation is the manifestation of a mental entity’s pow-
ers. In the language of the powers theory of causation, Kate’s desire to raise 
her arm prevents the manifestation of her desire to keep her body still. One 
disposition may prevent the manifestation of another in one of two ways. The 
manifestation of the first disposition might lead to the loss of the second dis-
position (i.e. upon gaining the desire to raise her arm, Kate loses the desire 
to keep her body still). Or, the second disposition might be retained but its 
manifestation blocked by the manifestation of the first disposition (i.e. Kate 
retains the desire to keep still, but the manifestation of this desire is blocked 
by the presence of her overriding desire to raise her arm). There is, of course, 
more to be said about how the powers theory of causation should analyse 
cases of prevention, but none of it should involve talk of energy or forces. Any 
suggestion that it should involve such talk — that it should analyse cases of 
prevention in terms of underlying non-causal physical processes — would be 
to abandon the powers theory of causation for the energy transference theory 
of causation or some variant of it.
O2: m2 has the power to prevent n2 from causing b1. In the causal system 
represented in Figure 1, m2 fails to manifest this power because of the 
presence of m1. But what if we were to vary the circumstances slightly 
and imagine that m1 was not present? In these circumstances, m2 
would not fail to manifest this power, i.e. m2 would prevent n2 from 
causing b1. This would result in m2 affecting the amount of energy 
or momentum in the physical system or redistributing it. Hence, we 
14 For further discussion of this point, see Gibb (2010, §3).
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revert back to the original problem for interactive dualism that Papi-
neau’s argument raises.
R2: This problem is removed if in any case in which we have n2 and m2, m1 
is present to prevent m2 from preventing n2 from causing b1. This would be the 
case if some event in the causal chain of neurological events that gave rise to n2 
entailed the existence of m1. Hence, for example, if the existence of n1 entailed 
the existence of m1. This entailment relation between n1 and m1 would be ex-
plained if whatever neurological event that causes n1 also causes m1. This pro-
posal is wholly consistent with the kind of dualist emergentism that I wish to 
defend, which takes mental entities to depend on physical entities, but which 
understands the dependence to be a causal dependence. It is set out in the fol-
lowing diagram, where n0 is some further neurological event.
Responding to a similar objection in Gibb 2013, I provide a detailed expla-
nation and defence of this proposal (Gibb, 2013, pp. 204–207). Rather than 
simply repeating what I say there here, I refer the reader to that paper.
In short, my response to O2 is that, yes, if a mental event ever did prevent 
a physical event from causing some other physical event, on the basis of Papi-
neau’s arguments we would have good grounds to conclude that this would vio-
late Conservation. But I would want to hold that a mental event never actually 
does play this preventative role in the physical domain despite being disposed 
to do so, because it is naturally impossible for the combination of dispositions 
which would be required for the mental to manifest this disposition to arise.
O3: In Figure 2, n0 causes m1. But how, given the combination of Con-
servation and Energy, can a physical event have a (non-physical) mental 
effect?
 m1   m2     b2 
   b1  n1 n2 
 n0 
Figure 2
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R3: As with O1, this objection is compelling if one accepts the energy trans-
ference theory of causation. Given the energy transference theory of causation, 
for n0 to cause m1, n0 must transfer energy to m1. Given the combination of 
the energy transference theory of causation with dualism, the physical energy 
which n0 transfers to m1 must presumably be converted into sui generis men-
tal energy.15 But according to Papineau there is no sui generis mental energy. 
Hence, either, contrary to Conservation, n0’s energy loss is not compensated 
by an energy gain in m1. Or, contrary to dualism, n0’s energy loss is compen-
sated by an energy gain in m1, but it is a gain in physical energy.
But matters are different if, rather than accepting the energy transference 
theory of causation, one accepts the powers theory of causation. Given the pow-
ers theory of causation, if a physical event causes a mental event then this is 
not to be analysed as a physical event transferring energy to a mental event. 
Rather, for a physical entity to cause a mental entity is for a physical entity to 
manifest one of its powers and for the manifestation to involve a mental entity. 
Hence, the powers theory of causation provides no reason whatsoever to think 
that for n0 to cause m1, n0 must experience an energy-momentum loss and m1 
an energy-momentum gain. Hence, given the powers theory of causation, the 
claim that the combination of Conservation and Energy rules out n0 from caus-
ing m1 lacks motivation.
O4: The double prevention model assumes the powers theory of causa-
tion, and the powers theory of causation, unlike the energy transference 
theory of causation, is compatible with the rejection of Physical Deter-
minability. But this does not mean that the double prevention model is 
correct to reject Physical Determinability. Physical Determinability is 
supported by the empirical evidence. Consequently, the double preven-
tion model is implausible from an empirical point of view.
R4: Physical Determinability, as we have seen, is not entailed by the con-
servation laws. Nor is the denial of Physical Determinability obviously incon-
sistent with any other law of physics. So what is the empirical evidence that is 
supposed to establish Physical Determinability?
Papineau’s discussion provides no clue as to what this empirical evidence 
might be. His arguments for Energy — the argument from fundamental forces 
15  For an advocate of such a view, see Hart’s account of physical-mental causation, which is an attempt to 
combine substance dualism with the energy transference theory of causation (Hart, 1988).
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and the argument from physiology — do nothing to establish Physical Deter-
minability. According to Newtonian Law, the effect of a force is to bring about 
proportional changes in the velocities of the bodies it acts on. To deny Physical 
Determinability is to deny that the only way for a non-physical event to con-
tribute to determining a physical entity is by altering its velocity. Hence, it is 
to deny that the only way for a non-physical event to contribute to determining 
a physical entity is by exerting a force on it. As a dualist who rejects Physical 
Determinability does not understand mental events to be forces — that is, does 
not conceive of mental events as pushes and pulls in the physical domain — the 
issue of whether mental forces reduce to physical forces or whether there is any 
physiological evidence for mental forces is irrelevant in determining the plausi-
bility of Physical Determinability.
However, even though Papineau does not provide it, one might think that an 
empirical argument for Physical Determinability — which is similar in kind to 
the ‘no-gap argument’ that is sometimes alluded to for Completeness — is read-
ily available. It can be expressed as follows: Science has been highly successful 
in providing an account of how different kinds of effects in a physical system 
are determined. It does so by appealing to changes in the distribution of energy 
and momentum. It is, of course, true that current science is not yet able to pro-
vide an account of every physical effect. Undoubtedly there are physical events 
that have not yet been examined, and physical events that have been examined 
but are yet to be explained. But science provides us with no reason to think that 
it will not be able to explain the determination of these events in exactly the 
same kind of way. Hence, on the basis of current physics, it is highly likely that 
Physical Determinability is true.
In reply, this argument simply begs the question against those dualist 
models of psychophysical causal relevance that reject Physical Determinabil-
ity. Hence, for example, to argue in this way for Physical Determinability is 
simply to ignore the double prevention model. The double prevention model 
sets out a way in which an event could contribute to determining a physical 
effect without redistributing energy or momentum (or altering the amount of 
energy or momentum in a physical system). And, precisely because this way of 
determining a physical effect does not involve affecting the amount of energy 
or momentum in a physical system or redistributing it, it is a way that an event 
could determine a physical effect that is likely to go undetected by science.16 
16  For a discussion of the claim that the causal role that the double prevention model provides mental 
events with is one that science will be blind to, see Gibb (forthcoming b) and Gibb (2013). 
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What is needed, and what this argument for Physical Determinability fails to 
provide, is a reason why the double prevention model fails to set out a way in 
which an event could contribute to determining a physical effect without af-
fecting the amount of energy or momentum in a physical system or by redis-
tributing it. But, as I hope this paper goes some way towards demonstrating, it 
is unclear what such a reason might be.
8. Conclusion
The focus of this paper has been Papineau’s attempt to defend the causal com-
pleteness of physics via an appeal to the conservation laws. I proposed that even 
if, as Papineau argues, there is no sui generis mental energy, the conservation 
laws do not establish the causal completeness of physics. Two further causal 
claims are required. First, the claim that the redistribution of energy and mo-
mentum cannot be brought about without supplying energy or momentum 
(Redistribution). Second, the claim that only way that something non-physical 
could contribute to determining an effect in a physical system is by 1) affecting 
the amount of energy or momentum in it, or 2) redistributing the energy or 
momentum in it (Physical Determinability). I went on to argue that the double 
prevention model of psychophysical causal relevance — a dualist model of psy-
chophysical causal relevance that I have recently proposed and which is located 
within the framework of a powers theory of causation — provides a way for the 
dualist to reject Physical Determinability. In rejecting Physical Determinabil-
ity, the double prevention model rejects Papineau’s argument for the causal 
completeness of physics via the conservation laws.17
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